

# Introduction: What Kind of Knowledge Is Museum Knowledge?

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The two long, thoughtful articles translated and printed in this book are historical documents, telling us something of what was being thought in Germany in the first decade of the twentieth century. They are riveting in their intelligence, conceptual acuity, and range of reference. Because of this they are also provocations to us, right now, to think with them about how objects teach, how this teaching is activated through the objects' display, and how we should think of the museum within the cultural sciences.

Why are we doing it this way? Why try to answer a question about our present through our past? Because a "critical historiography," in the sense Nietzsche intended, gives more than answers to present questions. We want to see what a forgotten body of knowledge might tell us, but we also want to know why we have those questions to begin with. Indeed, questions themselves have a history. So, while in this book we return to the German museums journal *Museumskunde* and its world in the years 1905–10, by engaging in a critical history of scholarship we can discover ways to a new museum thinking—and change the future.

## I

In 1904 the Kaiser-Friedrich-Museum, directed by Wilhelm Bode (he was not ennobled until 1913), was founded. In 1905 Adolf Bastian died. Bastian believed that ethnology museums constituted the material

archive of humanity. Their collections were to be research factories devoted to the production of new knowledge. He saw a sharp break between the wonder aimed at by the early modern cabinets of curiosities and the modern ethnological museum. Bode also saw a gulf between the idiosyncratic clutter of the *Wunderkammer* and the accessible aesthetics of the modern museum, leading him to characterize Bastian's museum-archive as an early modern dinosaur surviving into a later age. A generation later it was clear that Bode's vision had won out.<sup>1</sup>

*Museumskunde* began publishing in that same year, 1905. It was just a year after David Murray began his book *Museums: Their History and Their Use* by documenting the absence of a discussion of museums in the chief reference books of England, France, and Germany. At the time, museums did not even warrant a listing in the subject index of the British Museum.<sup>2</sup> The journal—edited by Karl Koetschau, who worked in the Dresden museums—has been the subject of new research, on both its attentiveness to questions of display and its cosmopolitanism, which was rare at the time.<sup>3</sup> In those early editions one sees the breadth of vision—the sense that the need of the moment was for tapping into a new and strong current of thought.

*Museumskunde* was, in fact, preceded by the *Zeitschrift für Museologie und Antiquitätenkunde*. It, too, had an editor associated with the Dresden museums—J. G. Theodor Grässe, who had headed the porcelain collection and then the Green Vault, with its *Wunderkammer*-like treasures. The publication was short-lived (1878–85), but observers have noted that it is “striking how contemporary many of the themes handled there are still today”—and this is true for *Museumskunde* as well.<sup>4</sup>

That the *Zeitschrift für Museologie* and *Museumskunde* were both based in Dresden reminds us how much innovative thinking there was outside Berlin. For example, the foundation in 1852 of the Römisch-Germanisch Museum in Mainz and the Germanisches Nationalmuseum in Nürnberg had generated significant theoretical discussion.<sup>5</sup> Likewise, the two articles under review here are by scholars who were formed outside Berlin. From our perspective, the founding of *Museumskunde* may mark the last flowering of a provincial leadership in Germany's museum culture.

The lack of constraint that might characterize being outside Berlin could extend to the editorial process, as Koetschau was willing to publish two very long multipart articles by two men in their early thirties who were at the beginning of their careers.

The men are Otto Lauffer (1874–1949) and Oswald Richter (1873–1907). Lauffer was then assistant to the director of the Städtisches Historisches Museum in Frankfurt, and Richter had just arrived, in 1904, at the Museum für Völkerkunde in Berlin from the Royal Zoological and Anthropological-Ethnographic Museum in Dresden. Lauffer would go on to a glorious career as a museum director, professor, and university rector—and then an ignoble posterity as one of Hitler’s willing professors.<sup>6</sup> Richter died at thirty-four, poisoned by an Indonesian arrow he had handled, a little too casually, in the course of his duties.<sup>7</sup>

It is unlikely the two knew each other, and yet, like Orion the hunter and Taurus the bull, their contributions to *Museumskunde* from 1906 and 1907 will never stop chasing each other. Lauffer’s appreciation of his mentor, Moriz Heyne, “and the Archaeological Foundations of History Museums,” appeared in *Museumskunde* in 1906 (page 153). Part 1 of Richter’s ten-part “On the Ideal and Practical Tasks of Ethnographic Museums” followed on page 189. In 1907 the first of Lauffer’s four-part “The Historical Museum: Its Character, Its Work, and How It Differs from Museums of Art and Applied Arts” was followed directly by part 2 of Richter (page 1 and page 14), and part 2 of Lauffer was followed by part 3 of Richter (page 78 and page 99). Lauffer’s parts 3 and 4 had no echo, perhaps silently marking Richter’s final collapse and death. The remaining parts of Richter’s book-length essay appeared posthumously, in 1908 and 1909.

Readers would have swung from Lauffer’s questioning of museum taxonomies to Richter’s; from Lauffer’s discussions of archaeology and history to Richter’s of archaeology and ethnography; and from Lauffer’s on the limits of collecting and collections to Richter’s on the same limits. Their similarities and differences would have been hard to pinpoint in the flow of words. By publishing them as separate pieces here we give each his due: the scale of their argumentative effort is fully visible.

What I would like to do now, though, is to read them together again as a single argument about the kind of knowledge that is museum knowledge. This will enable us to see important connections to others working at the time on the philosophy of knowledge. Establishing this context not only will deepen our understanding of these two essays, and our appreciation of their authors, but will also enable us to find in these discussions materials for our own use as we continue to seek new roles for museums and museum knowledge within the cultural sciences and between the university and the wider public sphere.

## II

The essays of Lauffer and Richter nest within the history of museums in Germany, and the history of museums in Germany is intricately bound up with the history of using objects as historical evidence.<sup>8</sup> Around 1900, the subject had become one of public debate. The historian Karl Lamprecht had challenged his colleagues to take seriously cultural history and material culture. They pushed back, accusing him of sloppiness and Marxism. Ethnologists like Bastian, for their part, argued for the importance of collecting and taxonomy but faced criticism from, among others, art historians, for collecting too many things and organizing them too poorly. These larger issues loom over the two essays we present here. The history of museum thinking in Germany should also be viewed in a still-broader, global perspective. In the United States, which was itself heavily dependent on German museum thinking—Gustav Friedrich Klemm’s thinking about cultural history, for example, influenced Otis Mason’s shaping of the Smithsonian’s Bureau of American Ethnology—George Brown Goode, assistant secretary of the Smithsonian, articulated a strong theory of the role of museums. In a lecture delivered at the Brooklyn Institute (soon to be Museum) in February 1889, he proclaimed that “the museum of the future must stand side by side with the library and the laboratory, as a part of the teaching equipment of the college and university, and in the great cities co-operate with the public library as one of the principal agencies for the enlightenment of the people.”<sup>9</sup>

Let us begin with Lauffer’s key term. It is not Goode’s “history museum” but the “historical museum,” and there are many types of content, he implies, that fall under this category. For instance, it throws a bridge out to folklore and ethnology, which “history” would not. Richter’s “ethnography,” in parallel, throws a bridge out to the archive studies of the research historian.

Ironically, while Lauffer devotes himself to the “historical museum,” and does so by comparing it with other kinds of museums, such as those devoted to archaeology, applied art, and ethnography, he is not interested in the history of these types of museums. Richter, by contrast, while ostensibly focused on the “ideal and practical,” is attentive to its history. He takes us through its early modern origins in the *Kunst- und Wunderkammern* of the baroque in some detail, reminding us that when Richter began writing, Julius von Schlosser had not yet published his epochal *Art and Curiosity Cabinets of the Late Renaissance* (1908). Richter

had to rely on much older works, Caspar F. Neickel's *Museographia* (1727) and Gustav Friedrich Klemm's *History of Collecting in Germany* (1837), which remained the standard reference works on the subject.

Instead of its history, Lauffer focuses on the idea of the historical museum and presents it as an *éloge* for Moriz Heyne. We include it in this volume as the prologue to his long essay because it introduces us to the essay's main theme: how to categorize material sources of the human past. For Heyne, all that survived of the past, literary or material, contributed to understanding the past in its fullness. Lauffer took his own broad commitment from Heyne.

Lauffer was also inspired by Hans von und zu Aufseß, the visionary founder of the Germanisches Nationalmuseum. Heyne, who was on the advisory board, brought Lauffer to work there just after he finished his doctorate (1896) and before he moved to Frankfurt (1902). The Nürnberg museum was important not just for its vision but also for that vision's vicissitudes: Aufseß was succeeded as director in 1863 by August von Essenwein, who shifted the museum's orientation from cultural history to applied arts. The same objects were displayed, but they were now interpreted in a different direction. Heyne, in turn, merited praise not just for his awareness of the power of display but for his resistance to the trend started in Nürnberg of turning objects collected for their evidentiary value into objects displayed for their exemplary value.

The change at the Germanisches Nationalmuseum seems to have sharpened Lauffer's thinking about the difference between the historical museum and the applied arts museum. The collections of the former were of heterogeneous origin, function, and content. If they belonged together, it was only because they spoke, however tangentially, to a place and its story. The applied arts museum, by contrast, had it easy: objects were collected, organized, and displayed according to very clear categories, such as technique, style, materials, and period. That clarity seemed to amplify the institution's claim to tell people how to think about things.

Moreover, Lauffer argued, whereas art museums could always fall back on the ideology of aesthetic quality, historical museums could not. Museums of applied arts had as their mandate the improvement of quality in the present, and thus had to be attuned to historical quality. But because the mandate of historical museums was to cover all periods, not only those of outstanding achievement, they were indifferent to questions of quality. When historical museums did collect works of high

aesthetic intentionality, it had to be because those objects told something about the past that could not be ascertained otherwise—that is, where “art” functioned as evidence.

Lauffer saw the historical collection as existing in a direct relationship with place, and functioning, like a town archive, as a “vibrant and deserving protector of local historical research that presents varied educational materials to the townspeople” (65). This recalls Nietzsche’s praise of what the locally minded antiquarian could do.

The history of his city becomes for him the history of his self; he understands the wall, the turreted gate, the ordinance of the town council, the national festival like an illustrated diary of his youth and finds himself, his strength, his diligence, his pleasure, his judgment, his folly and rudeness, in all of them. Here one could live, he says to himself, for here one can live and will be able to live. . . . And so, with this “We,” he looks beyond the ephemeral, curious, individual life and feels like the spirit of the house, the generation, and the city.<sup>10</sup>

Lauffer’s discussion of the “problem of quality” in the historical museum was a problem for the ethnographic museum as well, and maybe more so. On the one hand, according to Richter, objects from South and East Asia were *too good* to belong in ethnography museums. Their home was the applied arts museum, both because the arts of Asia were highly developed and because they had had a “strong influence” on the development of European decorative arts. Guimet’s collection in Paris was a reference point for Lauffer. On the other hand, Richter considered the products of the rest of the world to be of very low quality. “The rest of American art,” Richter wrote, with its preference for the “monstrous and grotesquely distorted,” tends to overload the individual object with intentionally fantastic or temperamental imagery, giving American art the impression of “barbarism and repugnant ugliness.” Of the rest of the world, he concluded, only the Benin bronzes “approach the level of true portraiture.” They deserved to be in a “museum for non-European art,” he wrote, in an “eminent position that would, admittedly, be a struggle to fill” (116).

Thus, in the domain of ethnographic museums, the problem of “quality” was at the same time a problem of “place.” One solution to the problem of the extreme variability of these museums’ collections

was to limit their geographical scope, sending the South and East Asian collections to art museums. Another was to remove European folklore and prehistoric materials from the ethnographic museum and into their own dedicated institutions, limiting the ethnographic to the non-European.

Where the ethnographic museum did have a clear identity was in its ability to serve the present, at least according to Richter. He advances imperial service as a “secondary” task of ethnographic museums. Colonial success, which for him does include paternalistic effort, required knowledge, and this could come only from ethnography, with museums diffusing knowledge through their public programming. Commercial and political actors could be educated in the ethnography museum before leaving the metropolis.

Reading Richter today means reencountering the racist assumptions of 1900, when the essentializing of cultures and “league tables” of civilization were rarely discussed commonplaces. It also means acknowledging certain kinds of naiveté bordering on self-delusion—praise for the distinct, and beneficial, colonial mission of the cultured Germans, or uncritical genuflecting toward the Kaiser. And yet, and this is the complexity of historical realities that we seek in studying the past, Richter, like Adolf Bastian before him, was a cultural relativist whenever the point at issue was epistemological and not aesthetic or political.

He believed it unhistorical to consider European civilization as an absolute good, superior to all other cultures. And he believed it unhistorical to think that European civilization should be forced upon inhabitants of new colonies—displacing a locally evolved civilization that was not necessarily of intrinsically low value—and furthermore to believe that this force could employ any means necessary and require no plan for its acceptance. Richter quoted Felix von Luschan, one of Bastian’s disciples and successors in the Ethnology Museum in Berlin—and also holder of the first chair in anthropology at the University of Berlin: “The culture of the so-called wild tribes is not worse than our own—merely different.”

And Richter could also acknowledge that Germany’s vast ethnographic holdings were stolen—as were, by extension, those in other European countries—an acknowledgment that remains highly charged. Yet here he was, a young man writing in the first decade of the twentieth century: “Incidentally, until the seventeenth century ethnographic objects were looted items; in many ways they remain so today” (97). This combination

of attitudes that we find antithetical—support for colonial activity and uncomfortable awareness of the crime at the heart of collection histories—was not uncommon in the most intellectually sophisticated circles: Richter’s views seem identical to those expressed by Luschan himself.<sup>11</sup>

For both Lauffer and Richter, “display” was the means by which museums created knowledge, though each had different leading principles. In the same way that the collecting policy of a historical museum had to follow the “purpose” of an artifact, its display policy could not, for Lauffer, emphasize style or material or aesthetics. As for the tendency to use cultural-historical modes of display for a decorative arts collection, Lauffer dismissed this as just another form of art history. Later he would identify the art historical mode of display as “stylistic-historical.” He was very clear that display had to follow from first principles. For him, this meant establishing the purpose of an artifact.

A military saber, a senator’s rapier, and a hunting knife may resemble each other greatly, may stem from the same time period, may bear the same ornamentation, and may even have been created by the hand of the same master craftsman—but despite all this they may not be displayed together in a historical museum. The first is a weapon of war, the second is an antique communal artifact, and the third is a hunting weapon. Or, to provide another example: a silver drinking vessel, a communion chalice, and a guild goblet. In a historical museum they may not be grouped in the same showcase. (37–38)

Typology, which had served equally the ethnologist and the decorative arts specialist of the previous generation—Gustav Friedrich Klemm in Dresden was one, August von Essenwein in Nürnberg the other—was dropped in favor of purpose, or function. This, of course, demanded a familiarity with cultural context that the formal approach to shape or material did not. In other words, establishing “purpose” as the basis of display in the historical museum implied establishing historical scholarship as the basis of the historical museum. Self-conscious theorizing was a strategy of legitimation. “We must attempt,” Lauffer wrote, “to articulate the inherent principles that should guide the historical museum” (40). Lauffer’s quest for “inherent principles,” or the theory behind the practice, is part of his project of reconstructing curatorial practice, and thus regrounding the historical museum, in the early 1900s.

For the museum whose purpose was not aesthetic education, Richter wrote, a “beautiful exhibition” was one that engaged its audience as education. More precisely, “a beautiful exhibition of a scientific collection,” Richter continued, indicates a “well-ordered exhibition. Order means a methodical (or regulated) structure and visual clarity in the conceptualization.” Objects were to be grouped not by their artistic merit, their decorative qualities, or their ability to arouse the sentiments (146). In this last category Richter had in mind the new innovation of the period room. If the historical museum could accommodate beautiful objects that were especially full of meaning, then, speaking for the ethnographic museum, Richter felt moved to remind his readers that “art should not strive to dominate science. Art becomes sterile and unenjoyable when science seeks to dominate rather than understand it” (146).

The “order” in an ethnographic museum was to be provided by space, not time or function. “The criteria for ordering the material should always be geographic in the first place and formal in the second: this principle must provide the firm structure for the collection” (155). By “formal,” he referred to object types. Only within the subgroup of types was chronology to intervene as an organizing rule. Nor was Richter oblivious to the reality of display as an epistemological form. “Such an exhibit does not provide a factual cultural image of the way things actually were, but rather it creates images of cultures as they should be” (155).

Richter also analyzed the spaces in which objects were displayed—he disliked ornament and preferred a white box with nothing to distract the visitor. He argued that there should be an immediately recognizable organizing idea “that enables a narrower overview to group the objects easily and compare them within categories (such as sorcery and religion, weapons, clothing, jewelry, etc.), and a wider overview to instantly display the different ethnographic-geographic regions as self-contained entities” (149). Objects were not to interfere with other objects. Principles like symmetry were to be employed. The more art-historically interesting objects were to be placed closest to the visitor. The project of “visual explanation of objects” meant that objects, images, and copies could all be employed. Most important was the role of museum displays for providing an image of the character of different peoples.

Attention to display led Richter to insist on “the inalienable rights” (*Das gute Recht*) of a museum object. “After the extensive treatment an object undergoes to be ready for the museum, it earns . . . its place in a worthy, safe, tasteful, and scientifically appropriate exhibition as the subject of scholarly research.” In the future, he wrote, “we must promote

the idea that every object, no matter how insignificant its material or craftsmanship, deserves protection and careful treatment” (146). It is the ethnographer who defends the rights of the object regardless of its perceived significance, while it is the curator, or the curatorial side of the ethnographer—Richter does not distinctly separate the activities from the people—who presents them to the public. The curator had to know the collection and the space. He had to be willing to experiment and to fail. “He should not shy away from trying things. . . . He should deal with failures like a true artist and strive with patience and tenacity to achieve the desired outcome” (151).

Richter’s extraordinary formulation in terms of the “rights of the object” actually echoes the language used by W. M. Flinders Petrie in his just recently published *Methods and Aims in Archaeology* (1904). There is no way to know whether Richter read this work; nevertheless, there are some clear parallels. First of all, Petrie also mixes the “ideal” and “practical” tasks. The latter take in chapters devoted to “the excavator,” “the labourers,” “recording in the field,” “photographing,” “preservation of objects” and “packing”; the former, “archaeological evidence,” “ethics of archaeology,” and “the fascination of history,” with which he concludes.

And yet there is far more that resonates between the two short books. Petrie, like Richter, is engaged in defending the status of his field as a science. And, like Richter—and, indeed, as we have seen, Bastian—Petrie tries to uphold the value of material culture independently of aesthetics. Archaeology, he complains, “is still attracted by pretty things, rather than by real knowledge.”<sup>12</sup> Like them, too, his description of his own new science is as the science of the human, and if Richter had replaced its first word with “Ethnology,” no one would have found a thought out of place: “Archaeology,—the knowledge of how man has acquired his present position and powers—is one of the widest studies, best fitted to open the mind, and to produce that type of wide interests and toleration which is the highest result of education.”<sup>13</sup>

But to come back to “the inalienable right of the museum object” (*das gute Recht eines Museumsgegenstandes*), Petrie frames his whole chapter “The Ethics of Archaeology” in terms of rights. He begins by contrasting the individual right of the individual excavator with those of the wider community that has a stake in the archaeological research. (Like Bastian, Petrie writes with an urgency born of seeing excavations ruin sites and objects, and excavations themselves be destroyed by others.) Then he turns to the objects. He rails against “show museums

where display is thought of before knowledge.” For the sake of a single specimen, he writes, an entire ancient ensemble will be wrecked. And once entering a collection, an object will frequently be mistreated:

Stones will be built into walls, and ruined by the damp bringing salt out; objects are left to drop to pieces from lack of chemical knowledge, or from the official dread of the responsibility of doing right instead of allowing wrong. Information is deliberately destroyed; labels are thrown away or heaped together out of the way in a glass case where the objects are artistically displayed, with no more history than if they had come from a dealer.<sup>14</sup>

There are the rights of the community, the rights of the object, and, “in every direction,” Petrie continues, “we unquestioningly assume that the future has its rights.” And as we live in “past ages by insight and association,” we understand that the past, too, has rights. “A work that has cost days, weeks, or years of toil has a right to existence.” To let it be destroyed is “to destroy that portion of life solidified;—so much will, so much labour, so much living reality.” The life of past men—and past things—“preserved to us has rights as veritably as the life of present men.”<sup>15</sup>

Petrie’s skepticism about the stability of things—he spoke of “the transitory stewardship of things”—led him to skepticism about museums as *the* solution to the problem of past things. He feared that the wholesale gathering of objects would only “ensure that such things will perish in the course of time. A museum is only a temporary place.”<sup>16</sup> In contrast, the Germans were enthusiastic supporters of the museum as a new place of research. Lauffer identified this move with Aufseß’s vision for Nürnberg. His transfer of objects from the material world to the museum’s collection followed a taxonomic map that reflected an ambition to further research. And the museum’s display, in turn, followed the contours of that map.<sup>17</sup> Lauffer saw the historical museum as best geared for this task because it collected both texts and objects—an institutional heir to early modern antiquarianism.<sup>18</sup>

Both Richter’s and Lauffer’s museums were places of knowledge. But what kind of knowledge was museum knowledge? This question takes us to the heart of these two essays, and why they can be read as one argument. Lauffer proposed getting around the confusion surrounding the historical museum by rebranding it as a “cultural history” museum.

But this was itself an ambiguous category, then as now. As Lauffer noted wryly: “With this terminology, however, we have jumped out of the frying pan and into the fire” (42).

Cultural history may have been invented in the nineteenth century, but it sat atop a major intellectual and political fault line. Its subject matter was often attested through nontextual remains, and its categories extended well beyond the familiar boundaries of the political. Moreover, in contemporary Germany its focus on the people, and on the material remains of how ordinary people lived, smacked of Marxism and of 1848 (and then of 1871 in Paris), too much for a society struggling with its sense of proper hierarchy. Furthermore, those who did this kind of history operated outside the university and so felt little external need to define exactly what they were doing. Nature, and academia, abhorring a vacuum, others rushed in to supply definitions, not always sympathetically. But the problem did not go away, for as late as the 1960s two of the greatest living historians, both connected to the very stream we are discussing, wrote about the “problem” of cultural history or went off “in search of” it.<sup>19</sup> A scholarly generation later believed it had identified a “new” cultural history—something which provoked another scholar to point to the existence of this “old” (nineteenth-century) cultural history.<sup>20</sup> Lauffer was right: relabeling the history museum as the cultural history museum solved nothing, as it merely swapped out one uncertain meaning for another.

Instead of giving up, however, Lauffer boldly tried his hand at defining cultural history. He split it into six parts: concepts and beliefs, which included inner life (ethics, aesthetics, and legal studies); words, or the history in language; sounds, or the history of music; customs and practices, including the history of conventions and rituals; economic history, which became a slightly different category focused not on content so much as type of sources; and objects. This, in turn, broke down into archaeology, technology, and art history. Lauffer wanted to focus on objects, both because they had largely been ignored by academics and because, to him as a museum person, objects were central.

Lauffer’s effort to bend “cultural history” back toward the study of things more generally, including museum collections, represents a kind of resistance to the contemporary movement toward disciplinization. “The technological or stylistically oriented presentations favored by museums of art and applied art simply do not work in a historical museum. Only a cultural-historical—or, if another name is preferred,

an archaeological—presentation is appropriate here” (37). By identifying archaeology with cultural history Lauffer was hitching together two terms of still-mobile meaning, both derived from early modern antiquarianism, in the hope of establishing some new, firm definition.

For Lauffer, “object study” was not one thing but three. Seeking an object’s purpose was the task of archaeology; focusing on its material was the domain of technology; and studying its decoration was done by art history. Lauffer explained that he would have preferred to use the older term *Altertumskunde* rather than the newer “archaeology,” but the older term had already become obscure.

Archaeology involves all forms of external culture, regardless of material, technique, or style. The field studies the typical forms that objects took in order to fulfill a certain purpose at the time they were developed, as well as how these forms changed under the influence of new viewpoints, customs, and technical abilities, while still fulfilling their initial purpose. (46–47)

Archaeology also included those processes whereby “decoration may take over the form, so that objects no longer fulfill their intended purpose.” It extended beyond the objects themselves to all the neighboring departments of cultural history. The pursuit of these ghostly traces, as well as the attentiveness to neighborly relations, suggests that the study of *Nachleben*, as in the contemporary work of Aby Warburg, could be considered part of the province of archaeology.

Like Lauffer, Richter was also thinking about what he termed the “archaeological idea.” That this idea crossed the boundary between ethnography and cultural history is itself important to note, as Richter’s intellectual forerunner Kristian Bahnson had kept the ethnographic museum clearly in the category of cultural history museum.<sup>21</sup> In his discussion of religion and religious artifacts he explained that “this material can be called archaeological in that it has sharply defined boundaries and is particularly well suited to become the specialized or even primary purpose of a museum of ethnographic objects.”<sup>22</sup> The archaeological perspective meant emphasizing the cult’s actual artifacts, and the art historical, its representations of religious figures and ritual objects.

Richter also describes the passage of time in archaeological terms as the laying down of strata. Unpacking the way an earlier layer of meaning

was preserved in the art forms of a later one was what cultural history did—and this made its practice archaeological. Dating could be made precise by comparing artifacts and surviving texts. This had the effect of making cultural history heir to the antiquarians, who did the same thing for the same reasons, and not to the contemporary archaeologists, for whom prehistory had become the model. In fact, for Richter “prehistoric archaeology” was a “*contradictio in adjecto*” (127). It was simply, he thought, impossible to fully understand archaeological evidence that was not closely linked to written evidence.

Richter acknowledged that “the word ‘archaeological’ is not normally applied in this wider sense”—that is, as a method of cultural history or, in even more precise terms, “historical archaeology.” Rather, it was used to address the “artistic value and character of (classical and ancient) monuments” (127). It came from those who were interested in the history of ancient art. This was the tradition that began with Winckelmann, who used the direct term *Geschichte*, and that continued into the nineteenth century under the banner of *Archäologie der Kunst*, an ambiguous term that pulled in two directions. Classical archaeology derived from art history and so primarily focused on the form of the object. Objects as part of lived life in the past constituted, rather, the task of *Altertumskunde*—the eighteenth-century German term for antiquarianism. When Lauffer used the term *Altertum* in the singular (“an antiquity”; “an antique [object]”), he was pointing to the antiquarian end of the spectrum of *Archäologie der Kunst*. The assessment and constellating of these interpretations was the job of still another discipline, history. But this tripartite division of labor between history, art history, and archaeology had been sketched out only for ancient things—no one had yet made clear how it all worked for more modern artifacts. As Richter put it, “Interestingly, we lack a word that describes archaeological objects, or ancient monuments, from the viewpoint of general cultural history” (127).

Lauffer tried to provide an answer to the question Richter was asking by turning, once again, to Aufseß and the Germanisches Nationalmuseum. Aufseß had used *Altertumskunde* to refer to material remains from any historical period, whether ancient or early modern (the collecting policy of the Germanisches Nationalmuseum extended up to 1648). “Antiquities” had been used since the Renaissance in a fairly straightforward way to denote things from the past. *Antiquitates* was the larger whole that those terms together illuminated: law, religion, calendar, ritual, government, games—the realm which, by the middle of

the nineteenth century, was regularly being called “culture.” The study of antiquities was antiquarianism, or *antiquarisch*. It was Germanized in the eighteenth century as *Altertumskunde*, and this term was being used as late as 1878 to signify “material culture” more generally (as in the *Zeitschrift für Museologie und Antiquitätenkunde*). Lauffer wanted to make a clean break with this complicated past and so turned to the new word of the day: “archaeology.”

Lauffer’s antiquities, or *Altertümer*, fell into defined categories—and the categories were laid down, more or less, by Marcus Terentius Varro in the forty-one books of his *Human and Divine Antiquities* (first century BCE). He identified four types: public, private, military, and sacred. Lauffer’s narrower categories cut the same territory into eighths: family, domestic (“which, together with the first group, constitute the bulk of private antiquities”), civic and community, legal, ecclesiastical, profane art, scientific, and military (78).

Lauffer then used these categories to organize the display of objects in his “historical museum.” Those relevant to the household might be grouped in one room, whereas those relevant to the military or church might appear in another. One room per category might be ideal, but Lauffer admitted that the needs of different buildings had to be respected. These antiquarian-origin categories he redescribed as “culture groups,” following Otto Lehmann, director of the Mannheim and then Altona museums. That makes Franz Boas, in turn, into a disciple of Heyne and thus, more distantly, of the antiquarian origins of cultural presentation.

Archaeology as a window into past culture through things brought it very close to the meaning of ethnography. In fact, it was Lauffer who argued that “archaeology essentially is a part of ethnographic studies, limited to the past of its own people. Just as ethnography uses simple descriptions of external culture as the basis for deeper research into folklore, genealogy, customs, and conceptions—so too does archaeology use physical objects as the starting point for wider scientific research” (47). But this ethnographic aspect of the artifact did not depend on age-value. It is its “degree of difference” from the present that made something an “antiquity”—which is why folkloric objects could belong in a history museum. And to make this point Lauffer cites none other than Richter (88n4).

When Lauffer showed how “purpose” as a display principle was capable of discriminating between, in his example, a saber, a rapier, and a

hunting knife, he was approaching material remains as a historian. But he was also approaching his own culture as something unfamiliar and capable of being grasped only from the outside in. In short, he was thinking like an ethnographer.

When Richter placed the ethnographic museum in a genealogy that descended from the age of the *Wunderkammer*, he was thinking like an archaeologist. He noted, however, that the study of the distant past through things and the study of the distant present through things were done by the same people: the antiquaries. In the twinning of Richter and Lauffer, with each describing his vision in the terms of the other, there is a silent but uncanny return to the antiquarian synthesis. Lauffer's recourse to a Varronian *Antiquitates-Alttertumskunde* is the tip of this submerged continent.

When Richter, in turn, explained that he was using ethnography as a way of studying the "cultural lives" of peoples who developed outside the ancient Mediterranean in a "philological and historical-comparative way," he had one man in mind: the person he called "the old master." Out of the cosmos of Goethe's *West-östliche Divan*, Richter extracted a paradigmatic couplet.

He who knows himself and others  
Here will also see:  
That the East and West, like brothers,  
Parted ne'er shall be.

(Wer sich selbst und andre kennt,  
Wird auch hier erkennen:  
Orient und Occident  
Sind nicht mehr zu trennen.)<sup>23</sup>

Poetry in a museum taxonomy! Goethe had turned his research of the *Divan* years into the notion of *Weltliteratur*, or world literature. Citing Goethe was a way of making ethnography another kind of world literature. Richter actually saw the project of cultural contact between East and West as *the* fundamental subject of history, "already voiced by Herodotus, the father of history," and as the basis of his own work (133).

For Richter, this was a live issue, and not just because of the imperialist-colonialist dimension to the ethnographic museum addressed

earlier. The question of archaeology and its relationship to ethnography spoke to the fundamental scientific purpose of museums. Having archaeological monuments amid ethnographic collections allowed for a conversation between the artifacts. The archaeological brought out the slow-changing element of time in the ethnographic; the ethnographic, the possibilities for use in the archaeological. Having them together allowed for the curating of exhibitions that enabled one to travel in time from present to past, or past to present. “In this way, an archaeological collection of exceptional scientific merit could be curated to offer not only a lively understanding of the monuments but also an instructive glimpse into aspects of wider cultural history” (132). Richter thought that even a study of those considered “primitive” in fact “leads to an understanding of the present in a similar way as the study of the past.” Ethnographic museums worked like “museums of history and culture” inasmuch as they held up to view past ways of living or being which had “been fully or partly overcome.” The objects from our own culture’s past, as well as those from people who are “living testaments to our cultural past,” all spoke to distance (102–3).

### III

An introduction to Lauffer and Richter—one that aimed to interpret them for their most direct application to museum thinking as we know it—could stop here. These long-lost essays speak directly to today’s concerns about collection, display, interpretation, and taxonomy, as well as about indigeneity and cultural property. For that reason alone they warrant disinterring, discussion, and incorporation into our own lumber room of ideas.

But they also, especially Richter’s piece, aspire to something else and, with that, open museum thinking onto a deeper and broader landscape of epistemological reflection. What might appear from the perspective of the history of museums to be metatheory in fact offers, I would argue, a bridge to the wider humanities. In what follows, we will build that bridge and then cross it.

Richter’s quotation from Goethe, significant in itself, is used to introduce a discussion of the “Ideal Tasks” of the museum. It begins with two sections devoted to what can only be described as a philosophical investigation.<sup>24</sup> These sections distinguish Richter’s treatment from

similar treatments of the topic, even those written not long after, such as Richard Thurnwald's "Über Völkerkundemuseen, ihre wissenschaftlichen Bedingungen und Ziele," published in *Museumskunde* in 1912. This suggests that the philosophical turn was Richter's interest, not the field's as a whole. It is the part of this essay that might still seem obscure. For example, he talks about a "comparative-genetic method," about "observational disciplines." He distinguishes between "causal analysis" and "logical analysis." He notes how ethnography tends to be associated with the "natural" rather than the "human" sciences, after identifying the former with "explanation" and the latter with "interpretation." It is "interpretation" and, connected to it, "criticism" that addresses the question of motivations that denominate the humanities (nature having no motives). But he also contrasts "understanding" and "knowledge." Linking these two registers, types of knowledge and their respective epistemologies, Richter concludes that ethnography defies identification with natural science both because of the "nature of its subject matter" and because of the "type of its research methods" (91–92). Richter's goal was to assert the place of ethnography amid the cultural sciences and to show how this mattered both internally to the history of science and externally to the history of ethnographic museums. Ethnography was to educate via the study of "material evidences" and use a museum's object holdings to illustrate "psychological" and "cultural-historical" truths (103).<sup>25</sup>

In reading these sentences one suspects that Richter is drawing on a conceptual vocabulary borrowed from elsewhere. For the practicing ethnographer, whether in the field or the museum, this part of Richter's account might have seemed superfluous, if not convoluted. For he was not intervening here in debates about objects or their display. If debates about an object's facticity are first order and theories of its presentation are second order, then Richter's interest in the conceptual foundations, or presuppositions, of those theories constitutes a third order and could be described as *metatheoretical*. In these sections Richter is inserting museum scholarship into the wider contemporary debate about the identity of the human, or "cultural," sciences. In fact, it is only by reading him in this context that we can glimpse, through the haze of his prose and in a project truncated by death, what he might have been aiming at and where his argument might have gone. But to fully understand this we will have to go outside the specific museums debate as it unfolded in the pages of *Museumskunde* and reach for the work of a thinker just then exploring the epistemological foundations of the cultural sciences: Max Weber.

In this section we will read Richter through the lens of Weber in order to better understand the terms he uses in this article. In the concluding essay we will read Weber through the lens of Richter. His exactly contemporary work on the philosophy of knowledge provided the kind of sharp-edged conceptual argumentation that Richter was seeking. By using Weber to elaborate what Richter only scaffolded, and then using Richter to draw Weber into an arena he ostensibly ignored, we can make the much bigger argument that Richter was never able to develop: that museum science is a cultural science.

When Richter begins by stating an opposition between the human and the natural sciences, he is nodding in the direction of the debate about the kind of knowledge that defined each of them. That debate was launched by Helmholtz's attack on Goethe qua poet doing science in his 1853 lectures at Königsberg and broadened in an 1862 lecture at Heidelberg devoted to explaining what was distinctive about the "sciences of investigation." Wilhelm Dilthey seems to have immediately responded. We have the early fragment "On the Study of Man and History" (ca. 1865) and then "On the Study of the History of the Sciences of Man, Society, and the State" (1875) leading to his *Introduction to the Human Sciences* (1883), which argued that the human sciences were a science, but a different kind of science. This was then rearticulated in the southwestern school of neo-Kantianism, first by Wilhelm Windelband in his so-called rectorial address, *Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft* (1894), and then by his student Heinrich Rickert, in his much more influential *Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft* (1896). Rickert and Weber were close friends and intellectual partners.<sup>26</sup>

Richter first argues that the natural and human sciences are actually both sciences of the empirical. Yes, ethnography had been identified with the natural sciences because of a "comparative" approach, which he equated with "natural scientific method." But in the very next sentence he undercuts this by arguing that its terms, "causal" and "logical analysis," "induction," and "comparison," were used in both the human and natural sciences. He then refers to the "method of individual and general comparison," which he says was "actually" the method of all the observational sciences, not just the natural ones (91).

This shared commitment to the empirical was reflected through two lenses. Richter argued that the natural sciences worked toward "explanation," whereas the humanities relied on "interpretation and criticism." Nature could be explained but not interpreted; human subjects could be interpreted but not explained. The reasons for this difference

were that, first, interpretation was about seeking internal motivation, while natural scientific explanation was about appearances. Second, interpretation was a function of understanding, and understanding of human beings was possible only by other human beings.

This whole paragraph of Richter comes straight out of Dilthey and Rickert. Schleiermacher put understanding, or *Verstehen*, at the heart of the biblical hermeneutic he developed. August Boeckh was his student and imported it into the philologist's toolkit. Johann Gustav Droysen sat in Boeckh's lectures in Berlin and then made it the theoretical centerpiece of the lectures he gave on historical method at the University of Berlin from 1857 onward and published in summary form in 1882. It was Dilthey who claimed *Verstehen* as the cornerstone of the human sciences.<sup>27</sup>

Richter went out of his way to cast the mental furniture of the ethnographer in the philosophical language of the day. "The ultimate objective of all ethnographic work, which is thus the general task of ethnographic museums, can only be this: to contribute to the knowledge and understanding of ourselves. Ethnography pursues such knowledge and understanding" (99–100). "Knowledge" (*Erkenntnis*) was important for the neo-Kantians, and "understanding," as we have seen, for the historians. We need not presume that Richter was quoting anyone so much as reflecting the mainstream of discussions of the human sciences circa 1900. But this attention to epistemology is so precise and unnecessary that it could not be there by accident.

Coming to know means differentiating and perceiving differences. To understand means to grasp or apprehend the connections through which something has come into being. Knowledge of ourselves implies, for the ethnographer, knowledge of our character: that is, (1) knowledge of the general similarity of psychological elements, above all the most common needs of all human communities and their historical effects—which is to say, their external psychological effects (Bastian's "elementary thoughts"); and (2) knowledge of the actual formal differences in the social psychology of different human communities among the historical effects that depend on accidental, external stimulation, most notably the characteristic means which we as well as other people have developed in dealing with cultural pressures. An understanding of the present entails comprehension of how separate cultural traditions have evolved: be it the great expressions of cultural

life—including language and literature, mythology and religion, laws and customs, and so forth—or an individual, very specific, cultural-historical fact. (100–101)

Richter even presents ethnography as the necessary last step in bringing understanding back to the self. It was in the ethnographic production and not in the highest or most finely developed forms of culture, such as religion and art, that real understanding of the human was to be found. Warburg's exactly contemporaneous search for the persistence of the antique, whether in Athens or Oraibi, can be seen as a similar form of self-therapy. It was Freud who was just then taking this the next step, drilling for *Verstehen* deeper than had ever been done before. Freud's own archaeological collection sits at the point of contact between these deep histories.

The approach chosen by Richter in trying to identify the theoretical concepts lying behind ethnographic practice seems entirely Weberian: metatheoretical critique is used to establish learning on sure foundations. In this case, it is the old notion of ethnography as a natural science that Richter wished to reappraise by showing the common conceptual arsenal of all the empirical sciences.

That things had come to this pass was the result of two contingencies. First, the nineteenth-century disciplinary “moment” was made by ethnographers who were natural scientists. That earlier ethnographers were travelers or missionaries who were trained in philology or history—or in more recent times psychology—had been lost. Second, the central term, “natural scientific method,” emerged as a rebuke to positivist fact-mongering and as an encouragement “for empirical research to counter the speculative philosophy of Hegel.”<sup>28</sup> Richter pushed back against “natural scientific method” out of a conviction that terminology could smuggle in all sorts of occluded meanings and thereby cause confusion.

Richter had high hopes for what ethnography could do for the cultural sciences. He believed that the advent of ethnography as a settled discipline “would initiate a new era for the entire field of the cultural sciences.” Its use of “general comparison” as a method of studying objects extended beyond things to “religion (mythology) and customs.” Its spread—“the new methodology”—replaced the older “historical and comparative studies in the humanities.” Richter quoted Franz Boas proclaiming that anthropology had already become “a method applicable to all the mental sciences and indispensable to all of them” (93).<sup>29</sup>

Many of these sciences were already being studied alongside one another, Richter noted, in Karl Lamprecht's historical seminar at the University of Leipzig, titled "Exercises in Comparative Cultural History [*vergleichenden Kulturgeschichte*]." <sup>30</sup> If the ethnographic method was taking over the *Kulturwissenschaften*, then it was conceivable that ethnographic museums could set the tone for the other *kulturwissenschaftlich* museums. The museum was to show the "cultural-historical and psychological truths" arising out of its ethnographic material. To "research the intellectual results," as well as "to discover cultural-historical connections and the psychological laws of a people: these are the tasks of the field of ethnographic (and sociopsychological) science" (103). With this we can see that Richter, like Lauffer (though coming from ethnography rather than archaeology), was seeking to redefine how we understand the past through things.

Richter not only becomes less obscure when placed back into the wider contemporary discussion of the natural and human sciences, but he becomes a thinker with an argument. By 1900, Lamprecht's effort to make cultural history the cutting-edge interdisciplinary integrator had crashed upon the rocks of his own shortcomings. Lauffer and Richter pushed object-based history and ethnography into the gap left by Lamprecht's failure. This was a moment when it was possible to see the emergence of a new museums science within the new circle of the cultural sciences. <sup>31</sup> We might see Warburg, a former student of Lamprecht's who had planned to habilitate in anthropology in Berlin in 1896–97, doing this for his art historical cultural science. <sup>32</sup> And, in his essays of the first decade of the twentieth century, Weber was doing the same for the cultural science that he would not call sociology until 1910. We can read all these works, some famous and some forgotten, with enormous contemporary benefit, both for the creativity of their question posing and for the analytical incisiveness of their answer giving. We invite new readers of Lauffer and Richter to ponder how they might answer some of today's questions and, even more, how they might reframe and restate some of those questions. We present them to you here in the hope of enhancing the quality of our contemporary conversation with resources drawn from the past.

1. For this contrast, see H. Glenn Penny, introduction to *In Humboldt's Shadow: A Tragic History of German Ethnology* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2021), 1–14.
2. David Murray, *Museums: Their History and Their Use* (Glasgow, 1904), 1:v.
3. Andrea Meyer, “The Journal *Museumskunde*: Another Link Between the Museums of the World,” in *The Museum Is Open: Towards a Transnational History of Museums, 1750–1940*, ed. Andrea Meyer and Bénédicte Savoy (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), 179–90; Andrea Meyer, “Museums in Print: The Interplay of Texts and Images in the Journal *Museumskunde*,” in *Images of the Art Museum: Connecting Gaze and Discourse in the History of Museology*, ed. Eva-Maria Troelenberg and Melania Savino (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017), 93–110.
4. Werner Hilgers, “100 Jahre–69 Jahrgänge: Zum Jubiläum der ‘Museumskunde,’” *Museumskunde* 70 (2005): 7.
5. See Peter N. Miller, *History and Its Objects: Antiquarianism and Material Culture Since 1500* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2017), chs. 6–8.
6. On Lauffer, see Gudrun M. König and Elisabeth Timm, “‘Deutsche’ Dinge: Der Germanist Otto Lauffer zwischen Altertums- und Volkskunde,” in *Schriftlose Vergangenheiten: Geschichtsschreibung an ihrer Grenze—von der Frühen Neuzeit bis in die Gegenwart*, ed. Lisa Regazzoni (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019), 157–92.
7. Richter tells us that he wrote the article in 1904 and published a condensed version, “Zum Verständnis der ethnographischen Museen,” in the *Dresdner Anzeiger* on February 26, 1905. (Part of it was translated into Dutch as *Museum voor land- en volkenkunde en Maritiem museum “Prins Hendrik” te Rotterdam* [Rotterdam, 1906], 7–9.) Because we know little about Richter, I am extremely grateful to Christian Feest for the following information. Paul Oswald Richter was born on September 5, 1873, in Schneeberg/Saxony and studied Indo-European languages at the University of Leipzig under Karl Brugmann. His PhD dissertation, “Die unechten Nominalkomposita des Altindischen und Altiranischen” (1887), was published in *Indogermanische Forschungen* 9 (1898): 1–62, 183–252. (Part 1, an offprint of this article, was issued in book form in 1897, and both parts were published in 1898 by Truebner in Strassburg; both book versions include a CV that may provide some information on Richter’s family and early years. There appears to be no copy in either Frankfurt or Vienna; Harvard and Yale have copies of the 1898 edition.) In 1898 he was hired as assistant for ethnography at the Royal Zoological and Anthropological-Ethnographic Museum Dresden, where his colleague as curator was Willy Foy, with whom he wrote “Zur Timor-Ornamentik” in the *Festschrift for A. B. Meyer (Abhandlungen und Berichte des Königl. Zoologischen und Anthropologisch-Ethnographischen Museums zu Dresden* 8, pt. 3 [1899]). In 1900 he published two articles in the *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung auf dem Gebiete der indogermanischen Sprachen* 36: “Griech. Δεσπότης,” 111–23, and “Der Plural von gAw. mazdāh- hura-,” 584–89. In 1901 he published (with Adolf Bernhard Meyer) “Die Helme aus Messingblech aus Celébes

- und den Molukken: Die Bestattungsweisen der Minehassa in Nord Célebes,” in *Ethnographische Miscellen I* (*Abhandlungen und Berichte des Königl. Zoologischen und Anthropologisch-Ethnographischen Museums zu Dresden* 9, pt. 6), 32–144; and in 1903, again with Meyer in *Ethnographische Miscellen II* (*Abhandlungen und Berichte des Königl. Zoologischen und Anthropologisch-Ethnographischen Museums zu Dresden* 10, pt. 6)—a number of essays on Indonesian ethnography based on the collection of Paul Sarasin. He moved to the Museum für Völkerkunde in Berlin in 1904 and died there in 1907.
8. For the full account presupposed in the paragraphs that follow, see Miller, *History and Its Objects*.
  9. George Brown Goode, *The Museums of the Future* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1891) [From the *Report of the National Museum, 1888–89*, 427–45], 427. Goode also acknowledges Klemm’s importance here (435) and in the parallel *Museum-History and Museums of History*, a lecture originally delivered to the American Historical Association annual meeting in 1888, in which he also explicitly discusses *Culturgeschichte* as an untranslatable German term and institution occupying the space between fine art and natural history (Goode, *Museum-History and Museums of History* [New York: Knickerbocker Press, 1889], 270, 268). And we know that Richter knew Goode’s work: he cites him as the epigraph for his essay!
  10. Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life*, §3.
  11. See Perry, *In Humboldt’s Shadow*, ch. 3.
  12. W. M. Flinders Petrie, *Methods and Aims in Archaeology* (London: Macmillan, 1904), vii.
  13. Petrie, *Methods and Aims*, viii.
  14. Petrie, *Method and Aims*, 171.
  15. Petrie, *Methods and Aims*, 176–77.
  16. Petrie, *Methods and Aims*, 180.
  17. For the wider German story, see Miller, *History and Its Objects*, ch. 8.
  18. Comparison with studies of museum-based research a generation later underscores the intellectual sophistication of Lauffer’s and Richter’s youthful essays. See Fritz Drevermann, “Die Forschungsaufgabe der naturhistorischen Museen”; Max Sauerlandt, “Die Forschungsaufgaben der kunsthistorischen Museen”; and Wilhelm Pessler, “Die Forschungsaufgaben der kulturgeschichtlichen Museen,” all in *Forschungsinstitute: Ihre Geschichte, Organisation und Ziele*, ed. Ludolph Brauer, Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, and Adolf Meyer, 2 vols. (Hamburg: Paul Hartung, 1930), 1:164–74, 209–26, 260–79.
  19. Ernst Gombrich, *In Search of Cultural History* (London, 1970); Felix Gilbert, “Cultural History and Its Problems,” *Comité International des Sciences Historiques: Rapports* 1 (1960): 40–58.
  20. Lynn Hunt, ed., *The New Cultural History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Donald R. Kelley, “The Old Cultural History,” *History of the Human Sciences* 9 (1996): 101–26.
  21. Kristian Bahnson, “Ueber die ethnographischen Museen: Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Sammlungen in Deutschland, Oesterreich und

- Italien,” *Mitteilungen der anthropologischen Gesellschaft in Wien* 18, n.s. 8 (1888): 113.
22. Bahnson, “Ueber ethnographischen Museen,” 40.
  23. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Sämtliche Werke* (Frankfurt a.M.: Deutscher Klassiker, 1994), vol. 3/I: *Divan; Nachlaß-Stücke*, 614.
  24. Notes include references to two works analyzing contemporary philosophical arguments: Erich Adickes, *Kant Contra Haeckel* (1901), and Oswald Külpe, *Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Deutschland* (1902).
  25. Richter buried these discussions deep in his very long footnotes, where their importance and implications were hidden. They have been disinterred in order to make Richter’s vision more accessible.
  26. See Guy Oakes, *Weber and Rickert: Concept Formation in the Cultural Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988); Guy Oakes, “Rickert’s Value Theory and the Foundations of Weber’s Methodology,” *Sociological Theory* 6 (1988): 38–51.
  27. For a good summary, see Charles R. Bambach, *Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), chs. 2–4.
  28. Richter’s bibliographical citation offers a window onto what the standard sources on the topic were ca. 1900: Franz Bopp, *Über das Conjugationssystem der Sanskritsprache in Vergleichung mit jenem der griechischen, lateinischen, persischen und germanischen Sprache* (Frankfurt a.M., 1816); Jacob Grimm, *Deutsche Grammatik*, vol. I (Göttingen, 1819), and *Deutsche Rechtsalterthümer* (Göttingen, 1828); Adalbert Kuhn, *Zur ältesten Geschichte der indogermanischen Völker: Osterprogramm des Berliner Real-Gymnasiums* (1845), and *Die Herabkunft des Feuers und des Gottertranks* (Berlin, 1859).
  29. Franz Boas, “The History of Anthropology,” *Science*, n.s. 20, 512 (October 21, 1904): 513–23. Was “mental” the American translator’s way of reaching for the otherwise untranslatable *Geisteswissenschaften*?
  30. Miller, *History and Its Objects*, ch. 2.
  31. See Miller, “Kulturwissenschaft Before Warburg,” in *Aby Warburg 150: Work, Legacy, and Promise*, ed. David Freedberg and Claudia Wedepohl (Berlin: De Gruyter, forthcoming).
  32. See Horst Bredekamp, *Aby Warburg, der Indianer: Berliner Erkundungen einer liberalen Ethnologie* (Berlin: Wagenbach, 2019).